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Abstract 
When mismanagement and misuse run rampant in giant corporations, as in the case of 
Enron in 2001, good corporate governance becomes mandatory. From the perspective of 
the agency theory, the separation of capital owners and management must lead to 
strictly applied good corporate governance. The purpose is to eliminate any 
disadvantages to the corporation's objective, namely providing added values to all 
relevant parties. The agency theory also covers two aspects: agency issues and agency 
costs. The research uses the qualitative approach and data is gathered through extensive 
interview, secondary data, and bibliography study. Key persons among the sources are 
selected based on specific criteria. Data validity is obtained through the triangulation 
technique, and the samples used are PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk and subsidiaries. The 
results show that governance practices are unique in each corporation, in accordance 
with their characteristics. 
Keywords: agency theory, agency problem, agency cost, corporate governance, 
expropriation of minority shareholders 
Introduction 
The fall of Enron in 2001 has underscored the significance of Good Corporate 
Governance (GCG) in protecting the shareholders. Good and consistent corporate 
governance will reduce the mismanagement and misuse of company assets. 
Mismanagement in corporate governance is detrimental to the corporation's objective, 
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namely providing added values to all parties relevant to the corporation's operational 
activities. 
The necessity for GCG in each corporation can be viewed using corporation theory and 
from the agency theory perspective. Corporation theory defines corporate 
characteristics, while agency theory describes the conflicts. In classic corporation 
theory, the ones who own the capital are altogether the manager of the corporation, 
thus there will be no conflict since the two roles are occupied by the same persons or 
party. Therefore in such condition GCG is not required. This is contrary to the modern 
corporation theory that views corporation as belonging to the public, since investor 
participation is allowed. Internal funding is no longer adequate; therefore external 
funding, obtained by issuing stocks, becomes an alternative. This makes the capital 
owners and corporation managers to be two different parties that have different 
interests. In such condition GCG is mandatory. 
When a corporation allows investment by investors, capital ownership and corporate 
management become two separate entities. In capital markets in countries such as the 
US, stock ownership in a corporation is widely distributed. In Europe and Asia, stock 
ownerships are usually concentrated on one point. Concentrated ownership indicates 
that the stocks sold and purchased in open markets do not constitute the dominant 
amount of stocks, and stock ownership remains in the hands of a group of people or the 
government. Thus, there are majority stockholders and minority stockholders. 
Furthermore, according to post-modern corporation theory, extension of stock 
ownership leads to the loss of majority ownership. Due to the wide distribution of 
stockholders inside and outside the corporation, they are difficult to identify. 
Stockholders who are also corporate owners are separated from corporate management. 
If these stockholders lack sound business knowledge, a conflict of interests may ensue. 
Consequently, members of corporate management or agents become a dominant force 
in corporate control. Such a situation requires GCG (Arifin, 2005). It becomes more 
urgent when the stockholders, being widely distributed and fragmented into groups, are 
not in full control of the corporation. The GCG practice will ensure that all parties 
relevant to the corporate's operational activities are accountable. 
The CG concept is introduced by the Cadbury Report in 1992 in order to determine the 
appropriate measurements for good corporate governance. The concept offers a 
significant change in corporate governance adjustment, especially in regard to financial 
reporting and corporate accountability. Some of the generally accepted definitions of 
corporate governance are shown in Table 1: 
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Table 1. Definitions of Corporate Governance 
No Definitions of Corporate Governance Source 
1 ...the role of governance is not oriented toward the running of the business per 
se, but with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and 
controlling the management's executive actions, and with satisfying legal 
expectations of accountability and regulation from parties outside the 
corporation. 
Tricker (1984) 
2 ...the system through which corporations are directed and controlled. The Cadbury 
Report (1992) 
3 ...the structure, process, culture and system that result in the organization's 
succesful operation. 
Keasey and 
Wright (1993) 
4 ...the process of supervision and control intended to ensure that the company 
management act in accordance with the shareholders' interest. 
Parkinson 
(1994) 
5 ....the governance of an enterprise is the sum of activities that constitute the 
internal regulation of the business and are in compliance with the obligations 
placed on the corporation by the legislation, ownership, and business control. 
It includes the trusteeship of assets, their management, and their deployment. 
Cannon (1994) 
6 ...the relationship between shareholders and corporations, and the way in 
which shareholders act to encourage best practice (e.g. by voting at AGMs 
and through regular meetings with the corporation's senior management). 
Increasingly, this includes a direct action by shareholders, which involve a 
campaign by shareholders or a group of shareholders to accomplish change 
in the corporation. 
The Corporate 
Governance 
Handbook 
(1996) 
7 "Corporate governance is a set of rules that regulate the relationship among 
shareholders, corporation management, creditors, the government, 
employees, and other internal and external stakeholders. The rules pertain to 
their rights and obligations; in other words, a system regulating and 
controlling the corporation." 
Forum For 
Corporate 
Governance in 
Indonesia 
(FCGI) (2002) 
8 "The structure with which shareholders, directors, and managers set the 
company's broad objectives, and the means of achieving those objectives and 
monitoring performance." 
OECD 
9 "Corporate governance is a process and structure applied by BUMN divisions 
in improving business success and company accountability, in order to sustain 
the long-term value of stockholders while still serving the interests of other 
stakeholders, in accordance with laws, regulations, and ethics." 
Decree from 
State Ministry 
of BUMN
(2002) 
Sources: Solomon (2007) and Researchers (2011) 
The various theoretical concepts in Table 1 vary slightly in their definition of 
corporate governance, but in general they view all stakeholders as important. 
According to Tricker (1984), corporate governance is not limited to managing the 
business, but also includes general directives for the corporation through control and 
supervision of the management's performance. Also a priority is meeting the 
expectations on accountability from stakeholders outside the organization. In line with 
Ticker, the Cadbury Report (1992) describes CG as a system that directs and controls 
a corporation. CG is designed to ensure that directors and managers have 
accountability toward stockholders. As do Ticker and the Cadbury Report, Parkinson 
(1994) emphasizes the importance of supervision and control. The mechanism for 
supervision and control are crucial in ensuring that the corporation management's 
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decisions will benefit stockholders. Control and balance are required to prevent abuse 
of the corporation's resources and guarantee good performance in the corporation. 
While Ticker, the Cadbury report, and Parkinson emphasize supervision and control, 
Keasey and Wright (1993) incorporate culture into their CG concept. They posit that 
CG as a system is insufficient; therefore they define it as a structure, process, culture, 
and system that result in the organization's succesful operation. We can therefore 
deduce that a corporation's operational activities are the functions of the structure, 
process, culture, and system in practice. The Corporate Governance Handbook views 
corporation governance as a group of activities that shape the organization's internal 
rules in order to fulfill the obligations set by policymakers, ownership, and business 
control. 
Based on the above definitions, we may conclude that CG essentially concerns the 
system, process, and set of rules that regulate the relationships among parties with 
interests, especially in a narrow sense (the relationships among stockholders, the board 
of commissioners, and the board of directors) in order to achieve the corporation's 
objectives. The aim of CG is to regulate the relationships among stakeholders, prevent 
power abuse, and ensure that errors are immediately rectified. This corresponds to the 
objective of corporate governance according to OECD, "to create added values for all 
relevant parties." In achieving the objectives of CG, OECD Principle of Corporate 
Governance offers the following principles as guidelines: 
1. The Basis for Corporate Governance framework; 
2. The right of  shareholder’s and key ownership function; 
3. Equitable treatment of shareholder; 
4. The role of stakeholder in corporate governance; 
5. Disclosure and transparancy; and 
The responsibility of the board. 
  
According to Gillian (2006), the balance sheet model of the firm shows that 
corporation owners and corporation management are separate entities, which 
necessitates GCG. The separation between capital owners and management obliges a 
corporate governance that can create mutual trust. Capital owners entrust their assets to 
be professionally managed by competent hands that are, in turn, accountable to capital 
owners. Therefore, corporate governance must adhere to the corporate governance 
principles that refer to the implementation of GCG principles.  
Debt- 
holder 
 
 
Share- 
holder 
Board Director 
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Asset 
Debt 
Equity 
Figure 1. Company Balance Sheet (Gillian, 2006) 
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According to Gillian, The left side of the balance sheet shows the internal basis for 
corporation governance. The management's role is that of a manager or agent who 
decides how capitals are acquired and how to fund them. The funding for capitals is 
shown on the right side, which consists of funding sources, both internal (issuance of 
stocks) and external (issuance of promisory notes). The Board of Commissioners is 
established to supervise the management of capital owners' funds. The members are 
representatives of capital owners.  
A company consists of three groups: stockholders, commissioners, and top 
management. In accordance with Indonesian law, the important divisions in 
corporation governance consist of the Board of Commissioners, Board of Directors, 
and Annual General Shareholder Meeting (RUPS). RUPS is the part of a company 
with the ultimate power; it holds authority over matters not handled by the directors or 
commissioners (www.bumn.go.id, 15/2/2011). RUPS facilitates stockholders in taking 
decisions related to company investment. The decisions taken in the meeting must 
advance the company's long-term interests. Stockholders are not allowed to interfere 
in the Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors' duties, functions, and 
authorities. In traditional corporation theory, stockholders control the direction of the 
company's policy and activities. Stockholder groups elect members of the Board of 
Commissioners, and also the Boards of Directors. These highest-ranking leaders will 
then manage the corporation to serve the stockholders' interests. In closed 
corporations, stockholders, directors, and commissioners often overlap; on the 
contrary, in public corporations, usually the supervisory body, the stockholders and 
the management are distinctly separate groups.  
The Board of Commissioners is the highest-ranking division in corporation, function 
as a supervisory board and its role is to monitor managerial activities. The Board is 
expected to keep the management activities in line with the capital owners' interests. 
Muntoro (2011) states that the Board of Commissioners is the corporation body, 
tasked with conducting general and/or specific supervision and providing advice to the 
Board of Directors in running the company. Policies within the Board of 
Commissioners' jurisdiction are strategic and long-term in nature, including 
monitoring the company's ability in survival, business activities, and developing. On 
the other hand, the Board of Directors is fully responsible for running the company in 
service of the company's interests and objectives. It represents the company in and out 
of the court in accordance with the bylaws of the corporation. Within the Board of 
Directors is a director appointed to be the head of the limited company (PT). The 
director can be the company's owner or a professional appointed by the business 
owner to run and lead the PT. 
Stock ownership distribution rate in a company indicates the concentration of its 
ownership. When a certain group dominates stock ownership, it is a company with 
concentrated ownership. In contrast, when stock ownership tends to be distributed, it 
is a company with dispersed ownership. When stock ownership is dominated by a 
large group, control by minor stock ownership groups tends to be weak. The latter's 
inability to conduct a supervision is closely tied to "free rider" issues. 
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Companies in many Asian countries, including Indonesia, are companies with 
concentrated ownerships. Therefore, company management falls under the authority of 
stockholders who control the company. The basic problem regarding corporate 
governance in companies with concentrated ownerships is how to protect minority 
stockholders from having their rights expropriated by majority stockholders and how 
the former can act as a controlling force in the company. This problem follows from 
the assumption that stockholders and controlling forces in the company may only serve 
their own interests. This includes paying special dividends for themselves, encouraging 
the company to conduct business with other companies under their control, and 
working on speculative, high-risk projects or transactions, the consequences of which 
may have to be borne by other stockholders or investors (Muntoro, 2011) 
Agency problem arises when capital owners (principals) are separated from company 
management (agents) in their capacity as major business actors. According to 
Welbourne et al., in Obaid (1997): "Agency theory is concerned with the general 
problem of delegation, a situation in which the principal engages another individual or 
agent to perform tasks on behalf of the principal." In companies that have gone public, 
company owners are stockholders or principals, while the company is managed by 
company management or agents. The delegation of authority from principals to agents 
obliges agents to be accountable for their actions. However, both principals and agents 
have bargaining positions. As capital owners, principals have the authority to access 
the company's internal information. Agents, who organize the company's business 
activities, are informed of the company's actual and complete operations and 
performance. Nevertheless, company management does not have absolute authority in 
taking strategic, long-term, and global decisions. The reason is that the decisions still 
fall under the authority of principals as company owners. 
In addition, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983), 
principals and agents are in conflict with each other. "A problem exists when principal 
and agent have conflicting goals, as is the case with managers and shareholders of 
large public corporations, where the manager is typically not the majority shareholder." 
This implies that principals (capital owners) and agents (company management) have 
different and opposing positions, functions, interests, and backgrounds. Both sides 
stand in mutual need of each other, but in practice their interests and influences 
inevitably contradict and affect one another. Both principals and agents are assumed to 
be homo economicus and tend to acquire the maximum amount of benefit. In relation 
to this agency theory, Eisenhardt (quoted in Sarwoko, 2003) defines three types of 
assumption groups on which the theory is based. (1) Assumption on humans - humans 
is assumed to constantly pursue or prioritize their own interests. (2) Assumption on 
organizations - it is assumed that, within an organization, there will always be conflicts 
of purposes among parties with interest in the organization, as well as an exchange of 
asymmetric information between principals and agents. (3) Assumption on information 
- information is viewed as a commodity that can be sold and purchased. 
Based on the above assumptions, we can see how company management, in their role 
as agents, can use opportunities to their own benefit. Ideally speaking, the company 
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management must act on behalf of the shareholders' best interest, although it is 
possible agents will prioritize their own interests by maximizing the use of utilities. 
Furthermore, agents may also make systematic attempts to obstruct principals in 
making strategic decisions by providing unclear information. When agents act to serve 
their own interests at the expense of the company owners' interests, it may be because 
company management has complete information on the company, while company 
owners do not. In many literatures, this imbalance in information possession is called 
asymmetric information (Arifin, 2005). This requires a mechanism that guarantees that 
all interests will be served (Anandarajah, 2001). Appropriate measurements that can 
guarantee such a condition are called the corporate governance mechanism. Ross, et 
al., (1999) propose three controlling devices to be used by stockholders to guarantee 
that the management act in line with the stockholders' interests: (1) Stockholders elect 
and appoint the Board of the Commissioners members by way of voting. (2) Contracts 
with the management and arrangements for compensations should be obligatory, so 
that the management is motivated to achieve the stockholders' objectives. (3) When 
stock performance is low, the company will be taken over by another (a takeover).   
The principals' efforts to control agents and guarantee that they act in line with the 
former's interests are not an easy process and can be very costly. The behaviorial 
differences due to the two groups' divergent interests are called an agency problem. To 
reduce the problem, stockholders pay a cost known as agency cost. Weston and 
Brigham (1994) define agency cost as "the cost related to the monitoring of 
managemental actions, to ensure that they are consistent with agreements in the 
contract that bind managers, stockholders, and creditors. Agency cost can be the: (1) 
expenses in monitoring managemental actions (2) expenses in arranging the 
organizational structure in order to minimize unwanted managerial behavior, and (3) 
opportunity costs resulting from the loss of opportunity in acquiring profit as a result 
of limited managemental authority, due to which the management is unable to take a 
timely decision. This can be avoided if the management is also the company 
owner." (Weston and Brigham, 1994).  Meanwhile, Ross, et al., (1999) interpret 
agency cost as an expense taken from monitoring costs or the monitoring done by 
stockholders and costs from the incentives given to managers. 
On the other hand, principals as capital owners have the potential to act repressively, 
as they may consider themselves to have the highest power, being capital providers for 
the company and the organization's decision-makers with unlimited authority. This 
may lead to an increasingly heated and prolonged conflict that will harm all sides. 
Conflict may arise when there are two stockholder groups with significantly different 
characteristics. Several literatures call it the conflict between majority stockholders 
and minority stockholders, and majority stockholders have the opportunity to 
expropriate the minority stockholders' rights in many ways. Information gap, meaning 
the dominant group has the more comprehensive information, enables the group to 
make decisions and policies that do not contribute many benefits to minority groups. 
Prasetyantoko (2008) states that the condition may lead to the expropriation of the 
minority stockholders' rights. As has been previously explained, theory agency arises 
from the separation between two groups, capital owners and company management, or 
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majority stockholders and minority stockholders. The weakness of the theory is that it 
does not incorporate other stakeholders with interests in the company, such as 
employees and even customers. Incomplete information does not affect only capital 
owners, but also employees within the company and customers outside the company. 
Such a situation may threaten the company's growth, or even its credibility before the 
public. 
The current focus in corporate governance reformation in many countries, including 
Indonesia, is how to empower the Board of Commissioners and turn it into an 
effective, professional, and more accountable division. The revitalization of the Board's 
role becomes a strategic aspect, as the Board of Commissioners functions as the 
supervisor that ensures good corporate management. As in state governance, corporate 
governance is a basic component in management. The Board of Commissioners must 
be excellent not only in quality but also in regard to quantity. A more general review 
shows that the Board's role in corporate management contributes to the company's long
-lasting survival (Colley et al., 2003). The review on the importance of the Board's 
quality shows that, in a company that has survived for a long time, the Board of 
Commissioners is usually able to solve the company's problems. Doyle (in Colley, et. 
al., 2003) states that, in companies with poor performances, the Board of 
Commissioners are unable to solve problems effectively. Reviews on the Board of 
Commissioners' quantity usually involve company performance, as in the researches 
conducted by Teen (2006). Researches in Australia by Kiel and Nicholson (2003) show 
that the bigger a company, the more members there are in its Board of Commissioners. 
There are also more independent commissioners, and the President of the Board of 
Commissioners and President Director are often two different persons. The role 
separation is intended to optimize the Board of Commissioners' role as the supervisor 
and controller of the company. In Indonesia where double tiers are adhered, the duality 
condition becomes impossible. Thereore, the study on the board governance does not 
include the indicator of duality.   
The Board of Commissioners becomes the main focus as their main task is to protect 
the stockholders' interest, as dictated by the mandate from capital owners, by 
representing their interest in the business. Therefore, the Board of Commissioners' 
principal duty is to protect the interest of all stockholders and assist the company in 
maximizing its economic value. The Board elects and appoints executives to run the 
company (Anandarajah, 2001), and is obliged to provide guidance and counseling to 
company management. In addition, the Board of Commissioners is responsible for 
laying out company strategies, obtaining maximum return for stockholders, preventing 
conflicts, and handling the demands toward the company in a balanced manner (Guido 
and Alessandro, 2006).  
The importance of the Board of Commissioners' role is closely tied to its inherent 
nature. Previous literatures in general divide the Board's characteristics into three 
categories: composition, structure, and board process (Guido and Alessandro, 2006). 
The Board's composition is measured by its size and the proportion of independent 
directors. The Board's structure is viewed through the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) 
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dual positions and presence of board committees. The research by Chen, et al. (2006) 
confirms the importance of composition and meeting frequency in the Board of 
Commissioners. The proportion of independent commissioners, frequency of 
meetings, and tenure of board members indicate the fraud in the board. In support of 
his research, Chen compares companies that have experienced fraud with companies 
that have not. It is a valuable research in formulating the characteristics of Boards of 
Commissioners in companies going public in China. Almost all countries define the 
Board of Commissioners' role as the manifestation of its obligations. On the normative 
level, the Board of Commissioners' obligations concern fiduciary matters, loyalty, and 
supervision. In its main function as the supervisor of corporation management, all 
matters related to the Board of Commissioners become the main focus in corporation 
governance. In general, an accountable Board of Commissioners is an indicator of the 
corporation's accountability. 
Basically, corporate governance is a check and balance system that internally and 
externally guarantees the corporation's accountability to all stakeholders; it is also 
socially responsible in all areas related to the corporation's business activities. That 
having been said, the research conducted by Kurniawan and Indriantoro (2000; in 
Arifin and Rachmawati, 2006) indicates the poor corporate governance practices in 
Indonesia. (1) Due to the family-dominated ownership structure, small investors 
receive little protection. (2) The Board of Commissioners hasn't entirely fulfilled its 
role in voicing the aspiration or interests of non-majority stockholders. (3) An audit 
committee is not yet obligatory, therefore the quality of financial reports tends to be 
dubious. (4) Fair business is yet to be widely practiced. (5) The rates of transparency 
and disclosure are low. (6) Risk management practices need to be improved. (7) 
Creditors are yet to receive full protection. Other researches show that governance 
practices vary according to each corporation's ownership structure. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that governance practices differ from corporation to corporation, and 
result in different characteristics and problems. 
Djalil's (2006) review states that the crisis in Indonesia is caused by the lack of good 
corporate governance in many corporations. This situation is exacerbated by an 
unhealthy economic concentration. As an illustration, based on data from 1996, the 
top of the economic structure pyramid in Indonesia is occupied only by 200 private 
conglomerates (consisting of about 50 families) dan 100 large-scale state-owned 
enterprises. Bapepam Report in 2004 confirms this by showing that most of the 
companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI) are owned by families and 
the state. The middle level of the pyramid is nearly empty, and on the lowest level 
there are about 39 million small-scale economy actors and cooperatives, including 
informal sectors (Djalil, 2006). This imbalance, according to Djalil, contributes to the 
current economic condition in Indonesia. Morck (2007) calls this type of economic 
structure the pyramidal business group. The pyramid's structure is characterized by a 
condition where companies, both those that have gone public and those that have not, 
are dominantly controlled by a group of people. Nam, Kang and Kim (2001) state that 
the main characteristics in many Asian corporations are a high level of concentred 
ownership and a group of people dominantly controlling the corporations. 
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Governance issues are basically caused by the difference in interests among parties 
involved with the company. Governance issues in a private enterprise are naturally 
different from governance issues in state-owned enterprises. Suad Husnan (2000) states 
that governance issues differ in accordance with the characteristics of each corporation, 
which also determine the obstacles and challenges in GCG practices. In general, 
however, business actors are aware of the importance of identifying the obstacles, as 
poor GCG practices are detrimental to the corporation's survival. 
GCG practices are crucial in public companies, where transparency and accountability 
are mandatory. PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk is a public company and part of a large family 
corporate conglomeration in Indonesia.  The choosing of PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk is 
based on its unique characteristic: it is one of the business groups that started from 
family business and later develop into public business. The success of the corporation 
is proven by its form as a limited company with the most integrated Business Model in 
Indonesia Property Sector with the transformational achievement of: 
1. Transforming US $ 3  billion to US $ 8 billion in 5 years 
2. Improving performance and promoting double Lippo Karawaci’s market capital 
in short term. Building significant ‘leadership premium”. 
3. Globalizing investor based Lippo Karawaci. 
4. Strengthening residential/township group. 
5. Building transformational hospital group scale up to USD3.5 billion in 5 years. 
6. Building a USD3.5 billion assets management/REIT group in 5 years. 
7. More focusing on assets-turn deals. Realizing maximum value for hotel group. 
Building strong recurring extraordinary earning.  
The company has taken a significant, transformative step, which begins when the 
company owners decided to sell part of their stocks to the public. This is a stage where 
the company transforms from a closed corporation to an open one: a company with 
limited ownership (jointly owned only by a certain group) changes into a company 
with open ownership (jointly owned by stockholders). Initially a family company, the 
company has become a public one. Starting from this point, GCG principles must be 
applied in company management, in order to be able to compete with other companies; 
this means the transformation is absolutely necessary if the company wishes to 
compete on the international level. 
Research Method 
In this research, the qualitative method is used to answer the research question. 
Qualitative method is used to quarry the characteristic of governancein a corporation. 
According to Suad Husnan, each company has differentgovernance in accordance with 
the unique characteristics of thecompany.  Therefore, the research intends to to quarry 
on thecharacteristics and implementation of governance in PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk. 
 
The data are gathered through bibliography study, secondary data and extensive 
interview with key persons. The key persons chosen as the source are among others:  
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a. The Company Founder  as the owner and founder of the corporation, in order to 
learn his commitment and understanding of the importance of GCG in a limited 
company; 
b. The Independent Commisioner as a Representative of Minority Shareholder, in 
order to find out whether the role as as the Representative of Minority Shareholder 
can be well implemented or not; 
c. The Representative of the Board of Commissioners, in order to find out the practice 
of GCG in the corporation related to its role as the monitoring board in the 
corporation; 
d. The Representative of the Board of Directors, in order to learn the management 
practice in the corporation; 
e. The Representative of Employees, in order to find out whether their rights and 
obligations as employees are fulfilled within the business activities  of the 
corporation; 
f. And the Corporate Secretary, in order to learn whether her role has been well 
implemented in the corporation. 
 
Data reliability and validity is obtained through the triangulation technique and 
depends on consensus from key informants or stakeholders. Other sources include 
Bylaws of the Corporation and other corporation documents, Interim and Annual 
Reports, stock ownership documents, written reports, published and unpublished 
researches, published and unpublished biographies, books, periodically published 
articles on the corporation, the corporation's governance reports, and memos from 
important meetings. 
Result and Analysis 
PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk understands the importance of good governance in achieving 
high and sustainable company growth. As part of its responsibility toward all 
stakeholders, the company management adheres to and implements Transparency, 
Accountability, Responsibility, Independence, and Fairness (TARIF) as the key 
principles. The commitment is made clear in an interview, as quoted below: 
"As a company that has gone public, we must comply with government 
regulations by following standard rules in company management." 
Transparency 
The transparency principle emphasizes the importance of openness in all company 
aspects related to public interest. The management must be open and information must 
be relayed in an accurate and punctual manner to all stakeholders, by publishing 
periodical financial reports (quarterly, semiannually, or annually), so that information 
pertaining to the company's business activities can be accessed by all. The information 
is available on the company website and IDX. The information taken from the 
corporate website is among others: 
a. Information on the corporate vision and mission, milestone, management team, 
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shareholder information, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and 
company activities. 
b. Information on the business unit consisting of urban development, large scale 
integrated development, retail mall, healthcare, hospitality and infrastructure, 
property and portofolio management, investor center and news/events of the 
corporation. 
c. Information related to the investors. Consisting of financial highlight, annual report, 
financial statement and company presentation. 
The website helps reinforce transparency in company management; this is in 
accordance with OECD's requirements for an accurate, punctual, and transparent 
disclosure of all information crucial to company performance, ownership, and 
stockholders. The Corporate Secretary is established in order to ensure the company's 
compliance to the transparency principle. It has a strategic role in maintaining the 
company's relations with stock market regulators, stockholders, the local community, 
and others, as well as the company's compliance with stock market regulations. Jenny 
Kuistono occupied the position from 2004 to 2009. 
Accountability 
As a public company, PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk must comply with the Bylaws and Laws 
for Limited Companies. Furthermore, it must also comply with the various regulations 
issued by the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI) and Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX), 
where PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk is listed as an open corporation. The company also 
regularly provides credit rate information to the public. On December 31, 2009, the 
credit rate for the company was B1 from Moody's, B from Standard & Poor's, and B+ 
from Fitch. The company management's accountability is indicated by the divisions' 
tasks and functions. The company's divisions form a GCG structure which ensures that 
GCG is applied to all operational and strategic activities. The company's core GCG 
division consists of the Annual Meeting of Stockholders, the Board of Commissioners, 
the Board of Directors, and committees (Audit Committees and Remuneration 
Committee). These committees have vital roles in GCG implementation and carry out 
their functions, tasks, and responsibility in an independent manner. Below are 
descriptions of the tasks and responsibilities of the company's governance divisions: 
Annual Meeting of Stockholders (RUPS) 
In order to ensure that all stakeholders are represented, various strategic decisions are 
taken during the Annual Meeting of Stockholders. The company adheres to Regulation 
IX.I.1 on the Planning and Presentation of annual stockholders meeting (RUPST) or 
Extraordinary RUPS (RUPSLB). RUPS is intended to facilitate all stockholders in 
voicing their opinions. 3 RUPS were held in 2010: RUPST on May 3, 2010, RUPSLB 
on the same day, and RUPSLB on November 29, 2010. The decisions taken in RUPS 
are then reported to Bapepam-LK and BEI, and publicly announced in national 
newspapers and through BEI. 
The following agreements are reached in the annual RUPS on May 3, 2010: (1) The 
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company's financial report at the end of the fiscal year (December 31, 2009) is 
approved. It has been audited by Aryanto, Jusuf, Mawar, and Saptoto, and their 
opinion on the report is unqualified. (2) The meeting agrees not to distribute dividends 
and allocate Rp. 1,000,000,000 for reserve funds and Rp. 387,053,495,627 as 
undivided profit. (3) Members of the board of commissioners, the board of directors, 
and independent commissioners are appointed. 
The following agreements are reached in the Extraordinary RUPS on May 3, 2010: 
(1) The company's plan to issue a bill of exchange valued at Rp. 2,443,620,749,632 is 
approved and authorized. The bill will be offered for trade at the Singapore Stock 
Exchange with a fixed interest rate of 9-9.5% per year, and the due date is in 2015. 
The bill will be exchanged with USD 250,000,000 and the remaining amount will be 
spent on assets (construction, hospital development, and others). (2) Current notes are 
exchanged with new notes with due date in 2015.  
The following agreements are reached in the RUPS on November 29, 2010: (1) The 
plan for the third stage of right issues with preemptive rights is approved. The value is 
Rp. 4,325,537,924 (Rp. 550 per issue). (2) The change in the company's article of 
association is approved in order to increase company assets, authorized at Rp. 
6,400,000,000,000 with paid-up capital as the result of the third right issues. 
The Board of Commissioners 
In line with the supervisory requirement for the company, and taking into 
consideration the company's business complexity, in the RUPST on May 3, 2010, 
members of the company's board of commissioners are appointed (Table 2). The board 
consists of a President Commissioner, whose task is to coordinate the board's 
activities; a Deputy Commissioner as the President's representative, who is also an 
Independent Commissioner; and six board members, five of whom are Independent 
Commissioners. The task of suggesting the names of Independent Commisioner is so 
far assumed by the Remuneration Committee who at the same time is responsible to 
improve the quality of the management of the limited company through the 
development of effective nomination mechanism and remuneration. The 
recommendation of name lists that meet the requirement is based on the achievement 
as well as the contribution toward the growth of the corporation.  
Table 2. Hierarchy of the Board of Commissioners in 2010, PT Lippo Karawaci 
Tbk 
Position Name 
President Commissioner  Theo Sambuaga 
Deputy Commissoner Surjadi Soedirdja 
Independent Commissioners Agum Gumelar 
Abeng 
Farid Harianto 
Adrianus Mooy 
Jonathan L. Parapak 
Member Vivien G. Setiabudi 
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The Board of Commissioners hierarchy for PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk as described 
above has fulfilled the regulations stated in the Circular from the Head of Bapepam-LK 
No. SE-03/PM/2000 and BEI regulation No. IA: In a public company, at least 30% of 
the members in the Board of Commissioners must be independent (Independent 
Commissioners). In PT Lippo Karawaci TBK, 62.5% of the board members are 
Independent Commissioners. They play an essential role in the company as they 
represent public interest through the supervision of company management. 
To account for its tasks and authorities, the Board of Commissioners submits a Task 
Report of the Supervision by the Board of Commissioners. It contains reports of the 
board's supervision at the year's end, is submitted to stockholders, and authorized in 
RUPST. The board's meetings are held at least once a year according to necessity. In 
2010, there were five Board of Commissioners meetings. A meeting is led by the 
President Commissioner; if absent, he or she is replaced by a member chosen by and 
from among the attending members. Absent board members may be represented by 
another member only after a letter of delegation is obtained. A Board of 
Commissioners meeting is valid and authorized to take binding decisions after more 
than half of the members are present or represented in the meeting. 
In the decision-making process in a Board of Commisioners meeting, the decisions are 
a general consensus reached after deliberation. When members are unable to arrive at a 
consensus, more than half of the valid votes are required to reach a decision. When the 
vote result is 50:50, the decision will be determined by the leader of the meeting. 
The Board of Commissioners is assisted in its tasks by several committees whose 
members are select experts. Currently PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk has an Audit 
Committee and Remuneration Committee, whose special functions and tasks are set by 
the Board of Commissioners. Audit Committee and Remuneration Committee 
members may later become Independent Commissioners and members of the Board of 
Commissioners. 
Thus far the Board of Commissioners has done exemplary work as a supervisory 
board, as stated in an interview with Theo Sambuaga: 
"There are no stockholders in the management or in the board of 
commissioners. Therefore, the commissioners are responsible for daily 
supervision, and some of the members are independent. So the openness 
principle is clearly in practice here, and commissioners supervise the business 
daily. In accordance with the management, the commissioners and directors are 
held accountable by shareholders. That's the main point."  
The indicator used to measure the supervision process by the Board of Commissioners 
is the members' presence in the meetings. Table 3 shows the members' attendance list 
in the five meetings during 2010: 
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Table 3. The Board of Commissioners' Attendance List in Meetings 
No. Schedule Percentage 
1 Feb-12-2010; Lippo Village 100 
2 May-25-2010; Aryaduta Hotel and Lippo Village 100 
3 Jul-29-10; at Lippo Village 75 
4 Sep-2-2010; St. Moritz 75 
5 Oct-8-2010; Kemang Village 87,5 
From the above table, we can conclude that, in general, members of the Board of 
Commissioners are aware of their responsibility as supervisors. Agreements reached at 
the meetings are recorded in the minutes, which are then submitted to the Board of 
Directors for evalutional purposes. The Board of Commissioners is assisted in their 
task by two committees, the Audit Committee and the Remuneration Committee. 
The detailed information concerning the attendance of the Commisioners Board 
members in each meeting is as follow:  
Table 4.  The Detail of Attendance List of Commisioners Board Members 
in 2010 
Source: The report of Corporate Governance year 2010, p. 77 
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Audit Committee 
The audit committee's function is to improve the quality of the financial reports in 
accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles. In support of the task, 
the committee is authorized to acquire relevant information from the company, such as 
internal audit reports. It is also authorized to acquire all relevant informants pertaining 
to company audit, and to communicate with internal and external auditors in order to 
develop an extra perspective. In 2010, the Head of the Audit Committee is Adrianus 
Mooy, and the members are Isnandar Rachmat Ali and Lie Kwang Tak. The position 
of Adrianus Mooy at the moment is as the Head of the Committee and an Independent 
Commissioner altogether. Born in 1963, Adrianus Mooy is elected as the Head of the 
Audit Committee due to his solid background as a financial expert and his previous 
position as the Governor of Bank Indonesia (1988-1993). In addition, he is a member 
of the Board of Commissioners in the Lippo Group since 1996. Table 5 shows the 
audit committee members' attendance list in meetings  
Tabel 5. The Audit Committee's Attendance List in Meetings 
 No. Schedule Percentage 
1 Feb-12-2010; Lippo Village 67 
2 May-25-2010; Lippo Village 67 
3 Jul-29-2010; Lippo Village 100 
4 Oct-8-2010; Kemang Village 100 
The above table shows that initially the percentage of member attendance exceeds 
60%. Later it increases and the last two meetings in 2010 were attended by all 
members. 
The following table is the detail of meeting attendance and agenda from the Audit 
Committee in 2010: 
Table 6. List of attendance of audit committee  
Source: The report of Corporate Governance in 2010 p. 79 
88              R. Kusumastuti, A. Kasim, / Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 1/2 (2012) 72-96                
 
Remuneration Committee (Remuneration and Nomination Committee) 
This committee is strictly mentioned in the corporate governance report as a 
Remuneration Committee. In fact this committee also serves as Nomination 
Committee. This is due to the fact that the remuneration arrangement for the corporate 
officials is based on the meritocracy system in order to promote better achievements. 
The remuneration giving is expected to reflect the reward upon position as well as 
expectation to maintain excellent performance. The committee is established in 
accordance with Law No. 40/2007 Article 96 on Limited Companies. The authority to 
settle on the amount of the board members' salary is regulated in RUPS (Law No. 
40/2007 Article 96). After the authority is conferred to the Board of Commissioners, 
the Board is then allowed to establish a Remuneration Committee with members from 
the Board of Commissioners. The Committee assists the Board of Commissioners in 
setting up the appropriate mechanism for nomination and remuneration based on 
meritocracy and contribution to the company. In regard to the employee appreciation 
system, Lippo Karawaci has applied the Reward and Recognition System. It regulates 
an integrated compensation system which incorporates the highest-ranking leaders 
down to the lowest-ranking staff in the organization. Members of the remuneration 
committee are Theo L. Sambuaga, Farid Harianto, Jonathan L. Parapak, and Vivien G. 
Setiabudi. Theo, the President Commissioner, is also a Remuneration Committee 
member, as are two of the Independent Commissioners (Farid Harianto and Jonathan 
L. Parapak), to even out the decision-making process. From the members of the 
committee it is seen that there is no member outside the Board of Commisioner. 
However the governance structure of PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk is unique since almost 
all members of the Board of Commisioner are Independent Commisioners, chosen 
professionally, except for Vivien.  Therefore the membership of Remuneration and 
Nomination Committee can be considered to have performed their duties 
professionally. 
The committee held a meeting only once during 2010, to discuss the remuneration for 
the members of the Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors.  
Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors is a company division whose function and responsibility is to 
manage and be in charge of the company, and maximize the resources in order to 
increase operational profitability toward an end result where the company's value 
increases in a sustainable manner. The board's responsibility and authority, from 
company management, risk management, to GCG implementation, is regulated in the 
bylaws of the corporation. However, the board's authority is limited, in that it requires 
permission from the company's board of commissioners for matters related to lending 
and borrowing money on the company's behalf, the disposal of the company's fixed 
assets, offering the company's real estate as collateral, adding assets to or reclaiming 
assets from other companies, right transfer or removal, or offering more than 50% of 
the company's net assets in one year as loan security. Furthermore, the Board of 
Directors' decisions regarding the following have to be pre-approved: material or 
conflict interest transaction as defined in Stock Market Regulations; transferring or 
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offering 50% or more of the company's net assets as loan security; revising the bylaws 
of the corporation; combining, merging, taking over, dissolving, or liquidating the 
company. Below is the hierarchy of the Board of Directors in 2010: 
Table 7. Hierarchy of the Board of Directors in 2010, PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk 
Position Name 
President Director Ketut Budi Wijaya 
Directors Tjokro Libianto 
Jopy Rusli 
E. Yudhistira Susiloputro 
Djoko Harjono 
During 2010, the Board of Directors held ten meetings with the following details: 
Table 8. The Board of Directors' Meeting Attendance List 
No. Schedule Percentage 
1 January 7, 2010 60 
2  February 8, 2010 80 
3 February 22, 2010 80 
4 March 8, 2010 60 
5 April 5, 2010 100 
6 July 20, 2010 100 
7 August 3, 2010 100 
8 September 7, 2010 100 
9 October 19, 2010 100 
 10 December 7, 2010 100 
The Board of Directors' member attendance in the meetings shows a better frequency 
in 2010. Out of the ten meetings, 60% are attended by all members. 60% to 80% 
members attend the remaining 40%. This indicates the members' awareness of their 
responsibility as the company management.  
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Table 9. List of Attendance of BOD meeting in 2010 
Source: Corporate Governance Report Year 2010, p. 82 
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Internal Audit Division 
The internal scope of corporate audit includes the internal and risk controlling as the 
implementation of Good Coroporate Governance. So far the corporation has no special 
unit to control risk.  The particular function is momentary assumed by the Internal 
Audit.  
Internal audit is also active in helping the Corporate Audit Committee to monitor, 
evaluate, and give recommendation for internal controlling, and indetify problems as 
well as avoid or reduce possible risk exposure.  
The main role of this division is to judge whether internal controlling system and risk 
management have functioned well.  This includes compliance audit of the entire 
corporate divisions in obeying the whole regulations, policies, plans, and budget that 
have been decided by the Board of Directors. This includes the investigation audit on 
the possibility that indicates mismanagement and misuse of position or manipulation.  
The implementation of Internal Audit is based on the annual working plan that has 
been approved by the President Director and Corporate Audit Committee.  The Internal 
Audit also conduct special audit if it is considered necessary by the President Director. 
The corridor of auditing refers to the Internal Audit Charter approved by the Audit 
Committee by considering the Internal Audit Ethic Codes and Internal Audit 
Professional Practice Standard as well as regulations in effect. 
Internal Audit gives report to the President Director and Audit Commision who 
regularly conducts meetings to discuss and review the internal report as further input 
for the Commision for its supervising task.  However, the data on the numbers of 
meeting in 2010 cannot be acquired. Nevertheless in the implementation of its job, the 
Internal Audit is helped by the External Consultant for risk mapping as an initial step 
to secure integrated risk management.  The appointed external consultant that serves as 
Independent Auditor are consultants from Public Accountant Office Aryanto, Amir 
Yusuf, Mawar & Saptono in order to fulfill the mandate from the General Meeting of 
Shareholders. The task of these independent auditors is to audit the books for the 
running year that ends every December 31. 
Independence 
The number of Independent Commissioners in PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk's Board of 
Commissioners has met the requirements stated in the Decree from the Director of the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange No. Kep-305/BEJ/07-2004, Rule No. IA, on the Listing of 
Stocks and Other Equity Stocks Issued by Listed Companies. The Decree requires that 
at least 30% of the Board of Commissioners members must be Independent 
Commissioners. Until the end of 2010, PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk had five Independent 
Commissioners or 62.5% of the total members of the Board of Commissioners. No 
members of the Board of Commissioners or Board of Directors are related by blood to 
the third degree, both vertically or horizontally, or related by marriage. 
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Company management is independent and not influenced by or under pressure from 
other parties. An interview with Mochtar Riady reveals that the company is committed 
to run an independent business: 
"Politics are important, but we must keep business and politics separate, so we 
won't thrive solely because of privileges. Bill Clinton and I were close because 
James used to be the president director of a large US bank, and when their 
government issued bonds, we were the ones to underwrite them. When Pak Harto 
had business with Clinton, we were the ones they called. So far we've had a good 
relationship with the current government. I don't talk too much about my personal 
life, like my birthday, or when my family members get married, I don't tell anyone. 
But I'll let you know when this company has its 60th anniversary." 
In regard to the division governance in PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk, the division members 
must not have positions in the current government in order to ensure the governance 
divisions' independence.  Jonathan L. Parapak and Adrianus Mooy were elected after 
they no longer held their previous positions as the Managing Director of PT Indosat 
Tbk and Deparpostel (Parapak) and Governor of BI (Mooy). This also applies to other 
Independent Commissioners, such as Agum Gumelar, Tanri Abeng, and Farid 
Harianto. They acquired their positions in the supervisory board after they no longer 
held positions in the government. Agum Gumelar was the Governor of Lemhannas, 
Minister of Transportation, and Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and 
Security Affairs. Tanri Abeng was the State Minister of State-Owned Enterprises and 
President Commissioner of PT Telkom Tbk. Farid Harianto was a special staff for the 
Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia and an Advisor for the Governor of BI. 
In the mean while, the independence on the internal side means that the corporate 
makes sure that each business unit is managed independently by competent 
professionals to meet the demand and expectation of the global, regional, and 
domestic markets in accordance with the GCG principles in effect. The Attitude 
Guidance, institutionalized since 2000 and renewed in 2005 is a guidance for the 
entire corporate members’ working performance and attitudes, since it also regulates 
conflict of interests and interdependence.  
Fairness 
The equality system is a principle where all stockholders and other stakeholders are 
treated equally. There are two types of equality. First, all stockholders have an equal 
opportunity to voice their aspirations in RUPS and RUPST. Therefore, minority 
stockholders are represented by Independent Commissioners. Second, the company 
recognizes the employees' diverse ideas and creativity, as employees come from 
various backgrounds. Therefore the company fully supports the fair opportunity 
culture, where success is determined by values and performance.  
The commitment on equality in treating all employees is also emphasized by the 
President Direcktor of PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk, Mr. Ketut who said: 
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“… here everyone is treated the same, be it the son of Mr. Mochtar or not …. 
Even so everything must be started from the bottom … work first … if later it is 
proven good, the the corporate will improve by itself …Each employee with 
merits will be given satisfiying reward; however those who are left behind will 
not be directly fired …. Instead they will be given coaching and training in 
order to improve their merits …” 
The values are the key to the success in attracting employees and maintaining their 
loyalty. In support of fair opportunity, the company develops an internal 
communication portal called "the village." It constitutes of various applications, 
including company rules, accessible to all employees. 
The corporation succeeded in achieving the title as one of the best 20 of “Most 
Admired Company” in 2011 by the Fortune Magazine, the evaluation of which was 
based on survey technique, both from internal and external point of views. This also 
proves that the corporate has succeeded in maintaining the best talent from its human 
resources. Such merit is the result of continuous investment of team building activities 
in the entire corporate business units.  
Discussion 
An important conclusion to be drawn from the governance structure described above is 
that none of the Riady family members occupy a position in a strategic governance 
division in the company, whether in the Board of Commissioners or Board of 
Directors. As company founders, the family group owns a major portion of the stocks 
in all subsidiaries. Mr. Mochtar, the major company founder, is instead the President 
Director at the Mochtar Riady Nanotechnology Institute. The research by Kiel and 
Nicholson shows that a larger company tends to have more members in the Board of 
Commissioners, more Independent Commissioners, and the President of the Board of 
Commissioners and President Director tend to be two different persons. The current 
research shows that PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk has the characteristics described in Kiel 
and Nicholson's research. The number of independent commissioners is quite 
significant, namely 60%: out of five commissioners, three are independent. 
Furthermore, in order to reinforce their roles and functions in accordance with the 
demand of well-applied GCG, the company appoints two different persons as President 
of the Board of Commissioners and President Director. It is assumed that these 
separate positions will reinforce the Board of Commissioners' independence and roles 
as the company's supervisory board. There is a difference between this current research 
and Kiel: in Kiel's, the composition of the Board of Commissioners is connected to 
company performance, which is measured by company values. A higher number of 
independent commissioners means better future values for the company. 
Structure-wise, the potentials for conflict resulting from the capital owners' dual 
position as both capital owners and company management have been minimized, by 
not allowing stockholders to occupy positions within the Board of Directors. This also 
applies in all PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk's subsidiaries, where stockholders are not 
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allowed to become members of the Board of Commissioners. 
Minority stockholders are represented in the Board of Commissioners by Independent 
Commissioners. The problem is that expropriation of retail stockholders is still 
possible due to asymmetric information. Using information to its advantage, company 
management can profit from corporation actions, such as through unfair mergers or 
transactions, which may lead to the weakening of minority stockholders' position.  
Conclusion 
Good corporate governance (GCG) practices become obligatory when a company 
decides to go public. Stock sale to the public is an alternative funding method when 
internal funding is no longer sufficient. Funding can also be an issue for companies 
that are still growing and expanding. PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk is a company that has 
gone public with multiple subsidiaries and has a wide range of businesses, from 
property to hospital services. 
The dominant ownership in the organization constitutes of five companies and 
investors with stocks amounting to less than 5%. Two potential conflicts may arise 
from this condition: expropriation of minority stockholders through unfair and 
nonstandard transactions, and agents acting on their own behalf. The governance 
mechanism is implemented as the principal’s effort tocontrol agents and guarantee that 
they act in line with the former’sinterest i.e. the choosing of the members of the Board 
ofCommissioners by the share holders in order to conduct the monitoringfunction 
professionally.  Apart from that, the number of independentcommissioners in the 
Board of Commissioners is more than the minimumnumber as stated in the effective 
regulation with the purpose ofprotecting the interest of the minor share owners.  The 
AuditCommittee ensures as well that the financial report is composed andpresented in 
accordance with the principles of accounting in effect.The establishment of 
Remuneration and Nomination Committee is a second device used to maintain the 
motivation of the top management in achieving the goals of the share owners since 
they are responsible topropose the remuneration budget for the members of both 
Board of Commissioners and Directors.  This is also an attempt to reduce theagency 
problem i.e. the cost related to the monitoring of managerial actions, to ensure that 
they are consistent with agreements in the contract that bind managers, stockholders, 
and creditors. 
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